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FM AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7952

INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY COLOMBO

AMEMBASSY DACCA

AMEMBASSY KABUL

AMCONSUL KARACHI

AMCONSUL LAHORE POUCH

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY TEHRAN

CINCPAC

USLO PEKING

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 5 ISLAMABAD 6452

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PINT, PEPR, MILI, US, XF, CH, XD, SHUM

SUBJECT: THE MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION AT ONE YEAR

REF: (A) ISLAMABAD 0335, (B) ISLAMABAD 6232, (C) ISLAMABAD 5684,
(D) ISLAMABAD 5306, (E) ISLAMABAD 5631, (F) ISLAMABAD 2294,
(G) ISLAMABAD 1995

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1. BEGIN SUMMARY: JULY 5, 1978 MARKS THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF
CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF GENERAL MOHAMMAD ZIA UL-HAQ'S BLOODLESS
TAKEOVER OF THE GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN. THE YEAR HAS SEEN ITS
SHARE OF TRANSIENT CRISIS, AS THE GENERAL HAS DOGGEDLY MAINTAINED
HIS EFFORTS TO CLEANSE THE POLITICAL SYSTEM, WHILE COPING WITH
HARD CORE PROBLEMS -- POVERTY, REGIONALISM, AND THE ABSENCE OF

DURABLE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS.

2. THE NATIONAL MOOD IN JULY 1978 IS ONE OF DRIFT, EXAGGERATED BY THE UNHEALED STRAINS OF THE TURBULENCE OF THE SPRING 1977, THE STREYAES OF CONTINUING POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY, AND THE MORE IMMEDIATE ANXIETIES OF AN EMERGENT COMMUNIST REGIME IN NEIGHBORING AFGHANISTAN.

3. ALL OF THE DILEMMAS WE OUTLINED IN OUR SIX-MONTH EVALUATION OF THE REGIME ARE STILL APPARENT: BHUTTO -- OR MORE IMPORTANTLY, THE POPULISM HE CONVEYED TO THE MASSES -- IS STILL A POWERFUL FORCE IN PAKISTANI POLITICS AND NO OTHER POLITICIAN OR PARTY HAS YET BEEN ABLE TO CHALLENGE HIM; THE MILITARY'S CREDIBILITY REMAINS TIED TO ITS CLAIM TO BE AN INTERIM AND IMPARTIAL REFEREE, BUT EVENTS CONSPIRE TO COMPEL GREATER SIGNS OF PERMANENCE AT THE HELM; AND A LAGGING ECONOMY CONTINUES TO PLAGUE THE REGIME.

4. MAJOR CHANGES IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS INCLUDE THE CONVICTION ON A MURDER CHARGE OF THE FORMER PRIMIN, A GROWING PUBLIC DISILLUSIONMENT WITH THE MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION (MLA), A TOUGHENING OF THE MLA'S ATTITUDE TOWARD POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND DISSENT, THE ANNOUNCEMENT THAT ZIA WILL APPOINT A GOVERNMENT OF CIVILIAN MINISTERS ON JULY 5 AND WILL HOLD ELECTIONS TO LOCAL BODIES BEFORE YEARS END, AND A PARADOXICALLY CONSEQUENT NARROWING OF THE CONSENSUS WHICH SUPPORTS MILITARY RULE AS A NECESSARY BUT TEMPORARY EXPEDIENT. THERE HAS ALSO BEEN A SIGNIFICANT WARMING IN CONFIDENTIAL

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SINO-PAK RELATIONS.

5. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR (CMLA) GENERAL ZIA MEANS WHAT HE SAYS ABOUT HOLDING NATIONAL ELECTIONS -- IN A MATTER OF "MONTHS, NOT YEARS." BUT HIS PROBLEMS CONTINUE TO ACCUMULATE, AS THE MILITARY GETS MORE DEEPLY ENMESHED NOT ONLY IN THE GOVERNANCE OF THE COUNTRY BUT IN ITS PATTERNS OF CORRUPTION, AS PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN HIS REGIME ERODES, AS ANXIETIES ABOUT PAKISTAN'S SECURITY AND FUTURE GROW, AND AS HE DEMONSTRATES REPEATEDLY HIS INABILITY TO FIND A PATH THAT LEADS BOTH TO STABILITY AND PROGRESS ON THE ONE HAND, AND TO ELECTED, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT ON THE OTHER. END SUMMARY.

6. JULY 5, 1978 MARKS THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE MILITARY REGIME WHICH CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF AND NOW CHIEF MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATOR (CMLA) GENERAL ZIA UL-HAQ IMPOSED ON THE COUNTRY WHEN HE LED A COUP WHICH OVERTHREW THE REGIME OF FORMER PRIME MINISTER ZULFIKAR ALI BHUTTO. IN THIS FIRST YEAR, THE MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION (MLA) HAS SEEN ITS SHARE OF TRANSIENT CRISIS, INCLUDING ZIA'S POSTPONEMENT OF NATIONAL ELECTIONS, THE UPS AND DOWNS OF THE NO LENGTHY "PROCESS OF ACCOUNTABILITY," HIS INABILITY TO INDUCE SIGNIFICANT POLITICAL ELEMENTS TO JOIN HIS

GOVERNMENT, THE ARREST, TRIAL, CONVICTION, AND APPEAL OF THE FORMER PRIME MINISTER ON A MURDER-CONSPIRACY CHARGE, A STIFFENING OF MARTIAL LAW RULE (INCLUDING A TOTAL BAN ON POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND ASSEMBLY), AND SPASMS OF UNREST FROM DISAFFECTED OR REPRESSED PARTS OF THE POPULATION, INCLUDING STUDENTS AND ORGANIZED LABOR.

7. SUCCESSES HAVE BEEN FEW, AND CMLA MOHAMMAD ZIA UL-HAQ, AN AMIABLE IF INSUBSTANTIAL LEADER, HAS HIMSELF SHOWN SIGNS OF IMPATIENCE AND FRUSTRATION WITH HIS INABILITY TO BREAK OUT

CYCLE OF DRIFT PUNCTUATED BY EPISODES OF STRONG ACTION. HE HAS MOVED IN FITS AND STARTS AWAY FROM THE INTERIM "90-DAY OPERATION" HE PROMISED IN JULY 1977 TO A MORE PERMANENT FORM OF ADMINISTRATION, AS HE HAS FOUND IT IMPOSSIBLE TO DISENGAGE THE CONFIDENTIAL

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ARMY FROM POWER OR FIND POLITICAL ELEMENTS WITH SUFFICIENT NATIONAL APPEAL WILLING TO SHARE POWER ON THE ARMY'S TERMS. IT IS THE MLA'S NARROWING BASE OF SUPPORT AMONG THE PUBLIC, EVEN TAKING INTO ACCOUNT ZIA'S NEW MINISTERIAL GOVERNMENT, COMBINED WITH AN INCREASINGLY EVIDENT "SIEGE MENTALITY," THAT MARKS THE MOST SIGNIFICANT CHANGE IN PAKISTAN'S POLITICAL SCENE SINCE OUR LAST "BENCHMARK" ASSESSMENT OF THE REGIME SIX MONTHS AGO.

8. THE NATION'S DILEMMAS: PAKISTAN'S QUANDARIES, TO WHICH WE DREW ATTENTION IN THAT JANUARY 1978 REPORT (REF A) ARE STILL EVIDENT; THEY CONTINUE TO DEFINE THE PARAMETERS OF DOMESTIC POLITICS, AND THE MLA IS NO CLOSER TO RESOLVING THEM THAN IT WAS LAST JANUARY.

9. PAKISTAN'S MAJOR DOMESTIC PROBLEMS ARE A RESULT BOTH OF ITS UNCERTAIN THIRTY-YEAR EXPERIMENT WITH NATIONHOOD, AND THE MORE IMMEDIATE RESULTS OF THE BHUTTO YEARS, CULMINATING IN THE TUMULTUOUS SPRING, 1977 ELECTIONS.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 2 OF 5 ISLAMABAD 6452

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

A. DESPITE A 1973 CONSTITUTION WHICH ALL CLAIM TO SUPPORT, PAKISTANIS HAVE YET TO AGREE ON HOW THEY SHOULD BE GOVERNED. PAKISTANI POLITICS REMAIN PERSONAL AND LARGELY NEGATIVE, A PHENOMENON STEMMING PERHAPS FROM FOUNDER MOHAMMAD ALI JINNAH'S TIRELESS REFUSAL TO ACCEPT ANYTHING LESS THAN AN ISLAMIC STATE FROM THE BRITISH. POLITICAL COALITIONS REMAIN CATALYSED BY NEGATIVE APPEALS, NOT POSITIVE PROGRAMS, AND LAST SPRING'S ELECTION CAMPAIGN RAN TRUE TO THIS FORM. THE FALLOUT FROM THAT
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ELECTION TURMOIL CONTINUES TO HAUNT AND COULD ULTIMATELY DOOM, THE MLA'S ATTEMPT TO RECONSTRUCT PAKISTAN'S POLITICS ALONG MORE STABLE LINES.

B. THE PAKISTAN NATIONAL ALLIANCE (PNA), IN MARCH 1977 A VIGOROUS NINE-PARTY COALITION, MADE ITS MARK BY BEING ANTI-BHUTTO, BUT THE ALLIANCE HAS GRADUALLY DISINTEGRATED WHEN FACED WITH A MILITARY GOVERNMENT WHICH WANTED TO SHARE RESPONSIBILITY BUT NOT POWER. BHUTTO, THE TARGET OF LAST YEAR'S ATTACKS, THIS YEAR WEARS THE MARTYRAJS ROBES AND SYMBOLIZES FOR MANY THE GROWING ANTI-MLA FEELING IN THE COUNTRY.

C. THE MILVHARY, AN INSTITUTION WHICH MANY PAKISTANIS SEE AS THEIR ONLY BINDING FORCE, HAS APPARENTLY ADAPTED ITSELF TO THE NUTS-AND-BOLTS OPERATION OF MARTIAL LAW. BUT THE ARMY, A FUNDAMENTALLY WESTERN MILITARY INSTITUTION THAT IS DESIGNED TO

GET RATHER THAN GIVE POLITICAL DIRECTION, REMAINS BASICALLY INCAPABLE OF LONG-TERM POLITICAL ADMINISTRATION. MANY ARMY OFFICERS WORRY THAT THEIR SERVICE WILL BE DESTROYED BY ITS PROLONGED EXPOSURE TO THE TEMPTATIONS AS A NATIONAL REFEREE. THE MILITARY'S TOP BRASS (NOW, OF COURSE, ALSO AT THE TOP OF THE MLA), HAS REACTED TO THIS FEAR BY "DIGGING IN" EVEN FURTHER, IN AN EFFORT BOTH TO PROTECT ITSELF AND TO ACCOMPLISH ITS PROFESSED DOMESTIC GOALS.

D. MUCH OF THE ECONOMY HAS BOUNCED BACK CONSIDERABLY FROM THE STAGNATION AND CHAP OF A YEAR AGO. SOME OF THE MLA'S INTERMITTENT ATTEMPTS TO REFORM THE ECONOMY AND GIVE IT A MORE MARKET ORIENTATION MAY HAVE CONTRIBUTED TO THIS IMPROVEMENT. NONETHELESS, SEVERE STRUCTURAL PROBLEMS ABOUND. FOOD PRODUCTION IS LAGGING, AND LOOMS AS AN EVEN LARGER PROBLEM THIS YEAR; THERE ARE DISTRIBUTION BOTTLENECKS AND PERIODIC SHORTAGES OF SOME ESSENTIAL GOODS; INFLATION HAS BEEN SLOWED BUT SOME KEY PRICES

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CONTINUE TO RISE AND THE PUBLIC PERCEIVES THAT PRICES ARE FAR TOO HIGH. THE MLA'S ATTEMPTS TO UNDO SOME OF THE WORST OF THE BHUTTO PERIOD'S IDEOLOGICALLY-BASED ECONOMIC POLICIES AND STRATEGIES ARE ALSO HAVING SOME POSITIVE EFFECT. A FEW OF THE MLA'S ACTIONS HAVE, HOWEVER, HAD POLITICAL COST, AT LEAST IN THE SHORT-RUN, AS A RESULT OF TEMPORARY DISLOCATIONS AND UNEMPLOYMENT AS WELL AS IN PROJECTING AN IMAGE WHICH SUGGESTS THAT IT IS THE "HAVES" ALONE WHO ARE THE BENEFICIARIES OF ITS POLICIES.

E. ECONOMIC POLICY REMAINS IN THE HANDS OF CIVIL SERVICE BUREAUCRATS. BUSINESS PEOPLE REMAIN CAUTIOUS IN THE FACE OF UNCERTAINTY AND DRIFT IN GOVERNMENT POLICY, EVEN THOUGH THE MLA, THROUGH DENATIONALIZATION AND OTHER PROMISES HAS TILTED IN FAVOR OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR. BUT FOR THE FORTUITOUS RISE IN REMITTANCES FROM PAKISTANIS WORKING ABROAD, THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS PICTURE WOULD BE HOPELESS. THE RESULT OF ALL OF THIS IS THAT THE LONGER THE MLA STAYS IN POWER, THE MORE POLITICALLY IMPORTANT ECONOMIC ISSUES BECOME -- ESPECIALLY PRICES, THE AVAILABILITY OF ESSENTIAL COMMODITIES, AND HOW WELL OR BADLY OFF PEOPLE THINK THEY ARE.

10. THE FIRST YEAR OF MARTIAL LAW.

A. THE POLITICAL PROCESS: THE POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY ENGENDERED BY LAST SPRING'S POST-ELECTION VIOLENCE AND THE ARMY'S BLOODLESS COUP HAS INCREASED OVER THE PAST YEAR. WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT GENERAL ZIA HIMSELF, AND THE ARMY GENERALLY, STILL WISH THEMSELVES OUT OF POWER; HAD THE GENERALS BEEN ABLE TO FEEL CONFIDENT OF TURNING POWER OVER TO A NON-BHUTTO GOVERNMENT, THEY WOULD ALREADY HAVE HELD ELECTIONS OR CONJURED UP A COALITION GOVERNMENT. THE MLA'S ABILITY TO HOLD ELECTIONS AND RETURN TO CIVILIAN ADMINISTRATION HOWEVER, HAS BEEN SHARPLY CIRCUMSCRIBED

BY THE CLOSELY DRAWN PARAMETERS OF POLITICS; DRIFT HAS BEEN THE RESULT.

--ZIA'S FIVE-MONTH-LONG EFFORT TO BROADEN HIS BASE BY ATTRACTING POLITICIANS INTO A NATIONAL, OR EVEN COALITION, CONFIDENTIAL

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GOVERNMENT HAS ENDED IN FAILURE; THE PNA LEADERSHIP AND THE MILITARY WERE FINALLY INCAPABLE OF AGREEING ON THE CONDITIONS AND PURPOSES OF SUCH A GOVERNMENT (REF B), AND RATIONAL DISCUSSION GAVE WAY TO POLITICAL BACKBITING, SUSPICION, PRESS LEAKS, AND MUTUAL EXPRESSION OF EXASPERATION. ULTIMATELY, IT WAS ZIA'S TRIP TO SAUDI ARABIA, WHERE HE RECEIVED THE PUBLIC BLESSING OF KING KHALID, AND THE PNA'S RELUCTANCE TO BE USED AS A SCAPEGOAT FOR MLA FAILURES AND FOR THE FINAL JUDGEMENT ON BHUTTO, THAT MADE THE MARRIAGE UNTENABLE. ZIA WILL NOW CONTENT HIMSELF WITH PNA SUPPORT, BUT NOT PARTICIPATION, IN HIS NEW GOVERNMENT -- TO BE APPOINTED JULY 5 -- AND FILLED LARGELY -- WE EXPECT -- WITH NON-POLITICAL, CIVILIAN MINISTERS.

--THE MLA APPEARS TO HAVE WEAKENED THE WILL TO RESIST OF THE PAKISTAN PEOPLE'S PARTY (PPP) BY KEEPING THE PARTY LEADERSHIP FROM FUNCTIONING. ALTHOUGH THERE HAVE BEEN RECENT RELEASES OF POLITICAL LEADERS FROM PRISON IN BOTH SIND AND PUNJABSN INCLUDING BHUTTO'S DAUGHTER BENAZIR, MUCH OF THE TOP PARTY HIERARCHY REMAINS IN DETENTZON. THOSE WHO REMAIN FREE ARE INTIMIDATED BY THE THREAT OF ACCOUNTABILITY FOR PAST ABUSES. THE MLA ALSO SUCCESSFULLY STAGE-MANAGED A RUMP SESSION OF PARTY MODERATES WHO "NAMED" ANTI-BHUTTO LEADER MAULANA KAUSAR NIAZI AS ACTING PARTY CHAIRMAN AND PROPELLED HIM TO FACTION -- IF NOT PARTY -- LEADERSHIP.

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 3 OF 5 ISLAMABAD 6452

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

CINCPAC FOR POLAD

--THE MLA HAS SO FAR FAILED IN ITS EFFORTS TO BUILD UP BOTH
KHAN ABDUL WALI KHAN, FORMER NATIONAL AWAMI PARTY (NAP) LEADER
AND NOW LEADER OF THE PNA CONSTITUENT NATIONAL DEMOCRATIC PARTY
(NDP), AND ASGHAR KHAN, CHIEF OF THE TEHRIK-I-ISTIQAL, INTO
NATIONAL LEADERS CAPABLE OF PULLING TOGETHER THE KIND OF
COALITION WHICH COULD SAFELY BE ENTRUSTED WITH NATIONAL
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RESPONSIBILITY. THE MLA'S FAILURE IN THIS RESPECT IS AS MUCH A
RESULT OF WALI AND ASGHAR'S DEFICIENCIES AS IT IS A RESULT OF THE
MLA'S MISCALCULATIONS.

--THE PNA HAS BECOME HOPELESSLY FRAGMENTED OVER THE PAST YEAR
AND IS NOW AN ALMOST IRRELEVANT ACTOR ON THE POLITICAL STAGE. THE
COALITION TO WHICH MANY LOOKED UPON TO BRING ABOUT CHANGE, HAS
FAILED THE CHALLENGE OF POSITIVE ACTION. NONE OF THE PNA'S
LEADERS HAS EMERGED TO OFFER A VIABLE POLITICAL ALTERNATIVE.

--FOR ALL THE MILITARY'S MANEUVERING, IT IS CLEAR THAT FORMER
PM BHUTTO IS STILL A VERY POTENT POLITICAL FORCE IN THE COUNTRY;
IF ELECTIONS WERE HELD NOW, HE WOULD STAND A GOOD CHANCE OF
EMERGING AS THE STRONGEST SINGLE POLITICIAN IN THE COUNTRY. EVEN
MORE IMPORTANT TO HIS SUPPORTERS, BHUTTO'S MESSAGE THAT THE POOR
SHOULD HAVE A VOICE IN POLITICS AND THAT GOVERNMENT SHOULD SERVE
THE NEEDS (HOWEVER ILL-DEFINED) OF THE PEOPLE, HAS BECOME A
PERMANENT PART OF PAKISTANI POLITICS, AND BHUTTO STILL HOLDS THE

IMAGINATION OF RURAL PEOPLE - A MAJORITY OF PAKISTANIS. THE PPP
FACTION HEADED BY MRS. BHUTTO STILL REPRESENTS THESE ASPIRATIONS

TO MANY, AND ITS GOALS AND RHETORIC ARE NOT LIKELY TO VANISH,
EVEN UNDER PRESSURES FROM THE MLA. EVEN THE PPP, HOWEVER, WOULD
NOT BE ABLE TO WIN A MAJORITY IN ALL FOUR PROVINCES.

--THE POLITICAL PROCESS HAS BEEN CRAMPED AND CONSTRAINED BY
THE IMPOSITION ON MARCH 1, AND ITS INDEFINITE EXTENSION ONE MONTH
LATER, OF A BAN ON ALL POLITICAL ACTIVITY AND ASSEMBLY, COUPLED
WITH A ROUNDUP OF WHAT WE ESTIMATE AS AROUND 2,000 PPP LEADERS
AND WORKERS. ALTHOUGH PARTIES HAVE SUBSEQUENTLY -- WITH MLA
BLESSING -- CONDUCTED SOME MEETINGS, PPP DETENUS ARE BEING
STEADILY RELEASED, AND ZIA HAS PROMISED TO EASE THE BAN IN
CONNECTION WITH LOCAL BODIES POLLS, THE POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE
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REMAINS STRAINED AND HIGHLY ARTIFICIAL IN THE ABSENCE OF THE
POLITICAL ACTIVITY NEEDED TO DEBATE ISSUES AND DEVELOP
ORGANIZATION AND SUPPORT.

--THE MLA HAS ALSO FAILED TO GAIN PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR ITS
ATTEMPT TO IMPOSE NIZAMI-ISLAM IN PAKISTAN. AS THE
"ISLAMICIZATION" PROCESS GRINDS ON, EVEN RELIGIOUS LEADERS ARE
BACKING AWAY FROM A REGIME BASED UPON LASHINGS, AMPUTATIONS, AND
WEALTH TAXES, AND WE HAVE BEGUN TO HEAR THE CLAIM THAT ISLAM IS
ESSENTIALLY A VOLUNTARY CREED. ZIA, WHO REMAINS A FIRM BELIEVER,
HAS BEEN UNABLE OVER THE PAST YEAR TO CONSTRUCT A POLITICAL BASE
ON A RELIGIOUS IDEOLOGY.

B. THE MILITARY: THE MILITARY REMAINS CAUGHT IN ITS SELF-SPUN,
BUT NEVERTHELESS CONFUSING, WEB OF POLITICS AND CIVILIAN
ADMINISTRATION, THE MLA'S SIGNALS ON ITS OWN INTENTIONS ARE OFTEN
CONFUSING. OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS THE MLA HAS BECOME
INCREASINGLY WELL DUG IN. RECENTLY REPORTED SHIFTS IN THE SENIOR
RANKS (REF C) REFLECT FURTHER SIGNS OF A BEDDING DOWN FOR THE
LONG HAUL. ON OTHER OCCASIONS, MILITARY SPOKESMEN, INCLUDING ZIA
HIMSELF, INVOKE ALL THE HOPES OF ELECTORAL DEMOCRATS, AND THERE
REMAIN THOSE IN THE ARMY WHO BELIEVE THAT, ONCE BHUTTO IS
EXECUTED OR CONFINED TO A LONG JAIL SENTENCE, ELECTIONS COULD BE
HELD. THE RECENT SUCCESSFUL POLLS IN BANGLADESH MAY HAVE
BOLSTERED THE MLA'S CONFIDENCE THAT THEY TOO COULD ULTIMATELY TO
TO THE PEOPLE, AND THE CMLA'S PROMISE OF ELECTIONS TO LOCAL
BODIES BY YEAR'S END IS A STEP IN THIS DIRECTION.

--OVER THE PAST YEAR, IN RESPONSE TO THE MLA'S RELUCTANT
BACKING INTO PERMANENCE, PUBLIC DISCONTENT WITH THE MLA HAS
GROWN, AND PAKISTANIS WHO WERE RELIEVED LAST JULY TO BE SAVED BY
THE ARMY FROM POLITICAL TURMOIL, HAVE CONTINUED TO GROW IMPATIENT
AND UNEASY WITH MILITARY RULE.

--DISSATISFACTION WITH ZIA WITHIN THE MILITARY HAS UNDOUBTEDLY
GROWN OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS, ESPECIALLY IN THE SENIOR RANKS,
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BOTH FROM THOSE WHO THINK THIS IS TOO SOFT A DORM OF MARTIAL LAW
AND FROM THOSE WHO FEEL THE ARMY SHOULD CALL ELECTIONS AND RETURN
TO THE BARRACKS. THERE STILL IS NO IDENTIFIABLE CHALLENGE TO
ZIA'S ULTIMATE AUTHORITY FROM WITHIN THE ARMY; TRADITIONAL
MILITARY DISCIPLINE DEMANDS AND GETS RESPECT FOR ZIA'S POSITION
AS CHIEF OF ARMY STAFF. THERE IS, MOREOVER, NO LOGICAL, AGREED
UPON SUCCESSOR.

--AS WE CAUTIONED IN OUR LAST ASSESSMENT, HOWEVER, THINGS
NEVER REMAIN STATIC. UNREST IN THE STREETS WITH WHICH ZIA COULD
NOT COPE MIGHT TRIGGER HIS OUSTER, ALBEIT WE BELIEVE IN A
PEACEFUL FASHION, BY HIS SENIOR COLLEAGUES. EVEN HIS CALL FOR
ELECTIONS TO LOCAL BODIES MIGHT SPUR TO ACTION THOSE WHO WANT A
CONTINUATION OF MILITARY RULE. SUCCESSION TO ZIA REMAINS MURKY,
AS DOES THE QUESTION OF WHO AMONG HIS ADVISERS EXERT THE MOST
PERVASIVE INFLUENCE.

C. THE ECONOMY: THE MLA'S MAJOR PROBLEM WITH PAKISTAN'S
ECONOMIC SITUATION A YEAR INTO MARTIAL LAW IS INCREASED PUBLIC
PERCEPTION OF ECONOMIC PROBLEMS AND THE DIFFICULTY THE MLA IS
HAVING DEALING WITH THEM. THE MLA HAS TAKEN ECONOMIC STEPS, OFTEN
WITHOUT SUFFICIENT AWARENESS OF THEIR POLITICAL IMPACT, TO
PROMOTE GROWTH THROUGH PRIVATE ENTERPRISE AND INVESTMENT, AND TO
UNDO SOME OF BHUTTO'S IDEOLOGICALLY MOTIVATED ECONOMIC DECISIONS.
ALTHOUGH THE ECONOMY IS APPARENTLY SHOWING SIGNS OF IMPROVEMENT,
DISTRIBUTION BOTTLENECKS AGGRAVATED BY CORRUPTION, LAGGING FOOD
PRODUCTION, AND INFLATION CONTINUED TO PLAGUE THE REGIME
THROUGHOUT ITS FIRST YEAR. HOWEVER, IT IS THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION
THAT SOMETHING IS NOT RIGHT, WHATEVER THE CAUSES, THAT IS NOW
HAVING A MORE IMPORTANT BEARING ON THE POLITICAL SCENE THAN
IT DID ONE YEAR, OR EVEN SIX MONTHS AGO.

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

--THERE IS RISING PUBLIC DISCONTENT OVER THE PROBLEMS OF
PRICE, QUALITY, AND DISTRIBUTION OF AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES,
SUCH AS WHEAT AND FLOUR. FREE MARKET PRICES OF BASIC NECESSITIES
HAVE CONTINUED TO RISE.

--THERE ARE ALSO PROSPECTS OF GRAIN SHORTPGES NEXT WINTER THAT
MAY BE WORSE THAN THOSE IN RECENT YEARS.

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--THE PUBLIC HAS ALSO COME TO BELIEVE THAT THE MLA IS NOT "ON
THEIR SIDE" THE WAY BHUTTO WAS. THIS IS APPARENTLY TRUE AMONG THE
POOR AND THE LANDLESS, AND WE HAVE RECEIVED REPORTS FROM MANY
PARTS OF THE COUNTRY THAT LAND-OWNERS, WITH THE SUPPORT OR AT
LEAST NON-INTERFERENCE OF THE LOCAL ML AUTHORITY, HAVE TAKEN BACK
LANDS GIVEN TO THE POOR UNDER THE PREVIOUS REGIME. WORKERS HAVE
ALSO BEEN RESTIVE, AS THE TIDE HAS SHIFTED TO GOVERNMENT SUPPORT
OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY, AND THEY HAVE BEEN DENIED THE RIGHT TO
BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY AND TO STRIKE.

D. FOREIGN RELATIONS. THE MLA IS MUCH MORE DEEPLY INVOLVED IN
FOREIGN AFFAIRS THAN IT WAS LAST JANUARY. EVEN BEFORE THE RECENT
EVENTS IN AFGHANISTAN, THE GOP WAS FINDING THE PULL OF FOREIGN
RELATIONS -- IN INTERNATIONAL REACTION TO THE BHUTTO CASE OR THE

NEED FOR OUTSIDE AID AND APPROBATION, FOR EXAMPLE -- AN INCREASINGLY ABSORBING PREOCCUPATION. THE RECENT COUP IN AFGHANISTAN, WHICH THE GOP SEES AS A STEP IN THE HISTORICALLY DETERMINED SOVIET THRUST TO THE WARM WATERS OF THE INDIAN OCEAN, HAS MADE ISLAMABAD EXTREMELY WARY AS IT LOOKS OUT ON THE NEW SOUTH ASIAN BALANCE.

--PAK-IRAN RELATIONS HAVE BECOME MORE TROUBLESOME FOR THE GOP DURING THE PAST YEAR. THE SHAH'S DESIRE FOR STABILITY IN PAKISTAN WAS PARTLY SATISFIED BY BHUTTO, ESPECIALLY IN 1975 AND 1976, BUT THE ZIA REGIME HAS NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO CONVINCE THE SHAH OF ITS CONTROL OR ITS COMPETENCE. ZIA'S EARLY DAYS IN OFFICE WERE MARKED BY HURRIED SHUTTLES TO TEHRAN TO EXPLAIN HIS LATEST MOVE OR TEST THE WATERS FOR THE NEXT. IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS, THE CMLA HAS BEEN A LESS FREQUENT VISITOR TO PERSIA, AND ALTHOUGH THE PRESS CONTINUES TO SING THE PRAISES OF PAK-IRAN BROTHERHOOD, STRAINS ARE EVIDENT. RECENT IRANIAN STATEMENTS (AND THE HALF-HEARTED DENIALS) THAT THERE WOULD BE NO FURTHER IRANIAN AID IF BHUTTO IS EXECUTED, OR THAT IRAN WOULD BE WILLING TO HAVE BHUTTO AS AN CONFIDENTIAL

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EXILE, HAVE NOT HELPED TO EASE PAK SUSPICIONS OF THE SHAH'S BULLYING BEHAVIOR OR OF A NASCENT IRAN AXIS WITH INDIA.

--ANOTHER PAKISTANI PATRON, SAUDI ARABIA, HAS MOVED INTO THE FOREFRONT OF SUPPORT IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS. THE SAUDIS MAY SEE IN PAKISTAN AN OPPORTUNITY TO WEAN AWAY ONE OF THE SHAH'S ALLIES, WHILE THEY MAY ALSO BE ENTRANCED BY ZIA'S DOGGED PURSUIT OF "ISLAMICIZAT ON" IN PAKISTAN. CMLA ZIA'S MOST RECENT TRIP TO JIDDA, FROM WHENCE HE CAME "REFRESHED IN MIND AND SPIRIT," WAS ONE OF TLSGH# POINTS OF HIS YEAR.

--RELATIONS BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN WARMED FOR THE FIRST PART OF THE MLA'S YEAR, BUT HAVE SINCE COOLED, AT LEAST ON THE ISLAMABAD SIDE. AS WE HAVE REPORTED (REFTEL D), THE GOP AND THE GOI HAVE AGAIN COME FACE TO FACE WITH THE HARD ISSUES, SUCH AS KASHMIR, AND UNDER THE GREAT CLOUD OF SUSPICION ISLAMABAD MAY SEE NOWHERE ELSE TO GO WITHOUT COURTING DOMESTIC TROUBLE. ALTHOUGH WE SUSPECT THAT KASHMIR IS LESS A REAL ISSUE ON THIS SIDE OF THE CEASEFIRE LINE THAN IT WAS IN YEARS PAST, NO GOVERNMENT IS STRONG ENOUGH TO FACE THAT FACT OPENLY. THE GOP ALSO REMAINS AGITATED OVER THE GOI'S QUICK RECOGNITION OF THE TARAKI REGIME IN KABUL, AS ANOTHER "SIGN" OF THE INDO-SOVIET ALLIANCE.

--RELATIONS WITH THE USSR HAVE BECOME AN INCREASINGLY IMPORTANT TOPIC OF DISCUSSION SINCE THE KABULNTLUP. THE GOP'S PERCEPTION OF THE SOUTH ASIAN BALANCE, AND ITS UNHAPPINESS WITH

THE LACK OF US STEADFASTNESS AS AN ALLY, HAVE LED TO BOTH STERN

LECTURES ON THE COMMUNIST MENACE AND HINTS OF A POSSIBLE MOVE TO A MORE NON-ALIGNED STANCE. HOWEVER, AS WE CONCLUDED (REFTEL E), ALTHOUGH A MEASURE OF ACCOMMODATION MAY BE ATTEMPTED (AND GHULAM ISHAQ'S TRIP TO MOSCOW IS PART OF THIS ATTEMPT) THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE GOP (AND THE USSR) AGAINST A DRAMATIC POLICY REVERSAL IN FAVOR OF THE SOVIETS WILL PROBABLY REMAIN THE STRONGER FACTOR, AT LEASO FOR A MILITARY GOVERNMENT.

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--CLOSE PAK-CHINESE RELATIONS WERE HIGHLIGHTED BY ZIA'S VISIT TO CHINA AND BY THE RETURN VISIT OH CHINESE VICE-PREMIER KENG PIAO AND A LARGE DELEGATION TO OPEN THE KARAKORAM HIGHWAY. THE KENG PIAO VISIT GAVE ZIA A MUCH NEEDED BOOST, AND THE CHINESE REASSURED THEIR PAKISTANI ALLIES THAT THEY WERE KEEPING A WATCHFUL EYE ON SOVIET MOVES IN AFGHANISTAN. ALL SIGNS POINT TO INCREASED SINO-PAKISTANI COOPERATION, EVEN IN THE FACE OF POSSIBLY CLOSER SINO-INDIAN TIES AND A GOP FLIRTATION WITH THE SOVIETS.

--THE NUCLEAR REPROCESSING ISSUE REMAINS AT THE HEART OF PAKISTAN'S DIFFICULTIES WITH THE US. WHILE THE GOP HAS ALSO BEEN CRITICAL OF OUR ACTIONS IN THE HORN OF AFRICA AND IN SOUTH ASIA, DIALOGUE ON THESE -- AND OUR ABILITY TO EASE PAK ANXIETIES -- REMAINS TIED UP IN THE IMPASSE ON THE REPROCESSING PLANT. THERE HAVE ALSO BEEN OTHER IRRITANTS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, INCLUDING THE US STAND ON THE GOP'S REQUEST FOR DEBT RELIEF AT THE RECENT CONSORTIUM MEETING, AND THE LOOMING ISSUE OF NARCOTICS CONTROL. ALTHOUGH THE GOP'S HUMAN RIGHTS RECORD IS AGAIN IMPROVING, WE HAVE ALSO HAD OCCASION IN THE PAST SIX MONTHS TO CHIDE THE MLA ON HUMAN RIGHTS, AND WE LICE#HAVE JOHCD#THE UNLOVED INTERNATIONAL BRIGADE THAT HAS PLED FOR CLEMENCY FOR FORMER PM BHUTTO.

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ACTION NEA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 EA-10 ISO-00 CIAE-00 DODE-00 PM-05

H-01 INR-10 L-03 NSAE-00 NSC-05 PA-01 SP-02
SS-15 ICA-11 HA-05 IO-13 AID-05 COME-00 EB-08
FRB-03 TRSE-00 XMB-02 OPIC-03 LAB-04 SIL-01
OMB-01 AGRE-00 ACDA-12 DOE-15 SOE-02 NRC-05 OES-07
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R 050822Z JUL 78
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TO SECSTATE WASHDC 7956
INFO AMEMBASSY ANKARA
AMEMBASSY COLOMBO
AMEMBASSY DACCA
AMEMBASSY KABUL
AMCONSUL KARACHI
AMCONSUL LAHORE POUCH
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY NEW DELHI
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY TEHRAN
CINCPAC
USLO PEKING

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CINCPAC FOR POLAD

11. THE YEAR AHEAD. ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ABILITY OF THE MLA TO
LAST ANOTHER YEAR LEAD US BACK TO PAKISTAN'S BASIC DOMESTIC
CRISIS. THE MLA WILL BE FORCED IN THE MONTHS ABEYANCE AGAIN TO
GRAPPLE WITH PAKISTAN'S INCREASINGLY DIFFICULT ECONOMIC PROBLEMS
AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS. ZIA WILL BE FACED WITH MUCH THE SAME
CHOICE HE HBP LAST JULY: RETURN TO POPULARLY ELECTED GOVERNMENT
OR A CONTINUATION OF MARTIAL LAW.

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--IT IS STILL POSSIBLE THAT ZIA WILL SET A DATE FOR NATIONAL
ELECTIONS, POSSIBLY IN SPRING, 1979, PROVIDED THAT HE CAN SATISFY
HIMSELF THAT BHUTTO OR HIS DESIGNATED HEIR WOULD NOT WIN AND THAT
THERE EXIST PAKISTANI POLITICIANS CAPABLE OF ALTERNATIVE
LEADERSHIP. ZIA WILL PROBABLY CHOOSE TO WAIT UNTIL AFTER THE
SUPREME COURT RETURNS THE VERDICT IN THE BHUTTO CASE, EVEN, IF
NECESSARY, TO THE YEAR'S END, BEFORE ANNOUNCING NATIONAL
ELECTIONS. THE MLA'S INTENTION TO HOLD LOCAL BODIES ELECTIONS
FIRST (AGAIN WITH AN EYE ON THE BANGLADESH MODEL), OFFERS AN
OPPORTUNITY TO TEST THE WATER AND RELEASE PENT-UP POLITICAL
PRESSURES.

--A FINAL DECISION ON BHUTTO'S FATE WILL PROBABLY FACE THE
CMLA BY EARLY FALL. IF THE SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS THE CONVICTION

AND SENTENCE, BHUTTO -- DISCLAIMERS NOTWITHSTANDING -- WILL
LIKELY APPEAL FOR CLEMENCY. (THE NATIONAL MOOD IS TO WATCH AND
WAIT FOR THE NEXT STEP IN THE BHUTTO SAGA, AND THIS HIATUS IN THE
ACTION HAS CUT BOTH WAYS IN THE POLITICAL ARENA: AS AN EXCUSE FOR
INACTION BY THE GOVERNMENT AND AS A CAUSE FOR THE RESTRAINT SHOWN
BY ANTI-MLA ELEMENTS.) NO OPTION ON BHUTTO'S FATE -- DOMESTIC
UNREST AND INTERNATIONAL CONDEMNATION AS A RESULT OF EXECUTION,
OR A STILL ALIVE, STILL DANGEROUS BHUTTO -- CAN LOOK GOOD TO ZIA.

--A CHOICE TO CONTINUE MARTIAL LAW, GIVEN A FAILURE OF AN
ELECTION SCENARIO OR PRESSURES FROM WITHIN THE ARMY, WILL
PROBABLY LEAD TO THE INSTITUTION OF A TOUGHER MARTIAL LAW REGIME.

--THE ECONOMIC SCENE ALSO PRESENTS SOME HARD CHOICES FOR THE
MLA. THE INTERNATIONAL DONOR COMMUNITY WILL TAKE A CLOSE LOOK AT
THE ECONOMIC SURVEY, THE BUDGET, AND THE NEW FIVE YEAR PLAN TO
ASSESS PAKISTAN'S ABILITY TO IMPROVE ITS ECONOMIC SITUATION. TH
MLA'S ABILITY TO STIMULATE DOMESTIC PRODUCTION BY INCREASING
INCENTIVES TO FARMERS AND PRIVATE INDUSTRY COULD BE SERIOUSLY
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ERODED BY THE PUBLIC PERCEPTION OF CORRUPTION, POLITICIZATION OF
THE PRICE MECHANISM, AND CONTRIBUTION OF ESSENTIAL
COMMODITIES.

--PAKISTAN WILL ALSO FACE THE CHALLENGE IN THE NEXT YEAR OF
COMING TO GRIPS WITH THE NEW BALANCE IN SOUTH ASIA. ISLAMABAD'S
UNDERSTANDING OF THE KABUL COUP OF APRIL 1978 IS NOT YET FULLY
SORTED OUT, BUT THE GOP IS CLEARLY FRIGHTENED OF WHAT IT BELIEVES
IS A NEW THREAT TO ITS SECURITY. THE MLA WILL BE FORCED TO MAKE
HARD CHOICES IN ITS RELATIONS WITH THE INDIANS (REFTEL D), THE
SOVIETS (REFTEL E), THE US AND THE FRENCH.

12. US INTERESTS. EFFECTIVE PURSUIT OF US INTERESTS IN PAKISTAN
DEPENDS PRIMARILY -- IN THE SHORT TERM -- UPON THE RESOLUTION OF
THE REPROCESSING ISSUE. IF THE ISSUE IS RESOLVED TO OUR
SATISFACTION, WE WILL HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY AND THE MEANS ONCE
AGAIN TO EXERT SOME INFLUENCE IN PAKISTAN. A BASIC COMPATIBILITY
OF INTERESTS EXISTSS BETWEEN PAKISTAN AND THE US: THEY WANT
SECURITY; WE WANT REGIONAL STABILITY; THEY WANT AID; WE WANT
THEIR DEVELOPMENT. WE WOULD LIKELY HAVE THIS COMITY OF INTEREST
WITH ALMOST ANY REGIME IN ISLAMABAD, WITH THE EXCEPTION OF A
RADICALLY LEFTIST GOVERNMENT.

13. THE LOGIC OF OUR INTERESTS IN SOUTH ASIA THUS DICTATES THAT
WE BOLSTER GOP CONFIDENCE IN THE FACE OF A POSSIBLE SOVIET THREAT
FROM AFGHANISTAN, BOTH WITH MILITARY ASSISTANCE AND ECONOMIC AID.
OUR NARCOTICS CONTROL EFFORT ALSO CALLS FOR CLOSER INVOLVEMENT,
AND WE MUST DO ALL THIS WHILE ALSO STRENGTHENING OUR RELATIONSHIP
WITH INDIA AND ENCOURAGING PAK-INDIAN RAPPROCHEMENT.

14. THE DIFFICULTY WE FACE IN PURSUING THESE WORAYY#POLICIES IS
POSED BY THE NATURE OF THE PAKISTAN POLITY AND THE NATURE OF THIS
REGIME. GENERAL ZIA HAS DISCOVERED, AS HAVE ALL PREVIOUS RULERS
OF PAKISTAN, THAT THE NATION IS EXTREMELY DIFFICULT TO GOVERN, SO
DIFFERENT ARE ITS REGIONS AND SO UNDER-DEVELOPED ITS POLITICAL
SYSTEM AND ECONOMY. GOVERNANCE HAS TOO OFTEN INVOLVED
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AUTHORITARIAN MEASURES, AND AUTHORITARIAN MEASURES TEND TO FORM
THEIR OWN CYCLE OF RESENTMENT AND REPRESSION. IN THE ABSENCE OF
PROCEDURES FOR ORDERLY, CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE, THE IMPULSE IS
TOWARD UNCONSTITUTIONAL, OFTEN VIOLENT, ACTION. ZIA MUST SOMEHOW
FIND THE MEANS TO BREAK THE CYCLE BY RECOURSE TO ELECTIONS, AND
BY SETTING THE STAGE BEFOREHAND TO ENSURE THAT THOSE ELECTIONS
PRODUCE STABLE CONDITIONS, SO THAT PAKISTAN'S FRIENDS CAN PROVIDE
BOTH ASSISTANCE AND ENCOURAGEMENT IN ITS LONG TERM SEARCH FOR
STABILITY.
HUMMEL

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 jan 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: MARTIAL LAW, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 05 jul 1978
Decaption Date: 01 jan 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 20 Mar 2014
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1978ISLAMA06452
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D780276-0305
Format: TEL
From: ISLAMABAD
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1978/newtext/t19780796/aaaadcod.tel
Line Count: 789
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 2c12fc7a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ACTION NEA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 15
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: 78 ISLAMABAD 335, 78 ISLAMABAD 6232, 78 ISLAMABAD 5684, 78 ISLAMABAD 5306, 78 ISLAMABAD 5631, 78 ISLAMABAD 2294
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 09 may 2005
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2117618
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: THE MARTIAL LAW ADMINISTRATION AT ONE YEAR
TAGS: PINT, PEPR, MILI, SHUM, US, XF, CH, XD
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/2c12fc7a-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Sheryl P. Walter
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
20 Mar 2014
Markings: Sheryl P. Walter Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 20 Mar 2014